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Abstract—Embedded software is developed under the assump-
tion that hardware execution is always correct. Fault attacks
break and exploit that assumption. Through the careful intro-
duction of targeted faults, an adversary modifies the control-
flow or data-flow integrity of software. The modified program
execution is then analyzed and used as a source of information
leakage, or as a mechanism for privilege escalation. Due to the
increasing complexity of modern embedded systems, and due to
the difficulty of guaranteeing correct hardware execution even
under a weak adversary, fault attacks are a growing threat. For
example, the assumption that an adversary has to be close to the
physical execution of software, in order to inject an exploitable
fault into hardware, has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect.
This article is a review on hardware-based fault attacks on
software, with emphasis on the context of embedded systems. We
present a detailed discussion of the anatomy of a fault attack,
and we make a review of fault attack evaluation techniques.
The paper emphasizes the perspective from the attacker, rather
than the perspective of countermeasure development. However,
we emphasize that improvements to countermeasures often build
on insight into the attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we consider the fault attack threat against
secure embedded software. Software plays a crucial role in
the functionality of embedded computers. For example, in a
System on Chip, software provides flexibility and it provides
the logical integration of specialized hardware components.
Secure embedded software is any software that employs secu-
rity mechanisms (e.g, confidentiality, integrity, authentication
and access control mechanisms) to ensure the security of
sensitive data and functionality. Secure embedded software is
therefore not only limited to cryptographic software, but also
covers access control and permission-rights management.
Embedded computers that run secure embedded software
are all around us. A large portion of the information ecosystem
consists of embedded connected computers that participate
in the physical control and the measurement of critical in-
frastructures and utilities, such as smart grid, automotive
and industrial controls. In addition, information technology
is pervasive in the immediate vicinity of people such as in
cell phones, activity trackers, medical devices, or biometric
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tokens. The data handled by these embedded computers is
sensitive. Computing devices in critical infrastructure execute
safety-critical commands and collect sensitive measurement
data protected by cryptographic keys and authentication codes.
Human-centric information systems work with private end-
user data, passwords, PIN codes, biometric data, location
history, and usage patterns. Furthermore, the firmware and
configuration data of embedded computing systems may rep-
resent valuable intellectual property.
The data and the unauthorized access of these embedded
devices is an obvious target for attackers. At high level,
the purpose of an attacker is to obtain control over the
execution of the embedded software, or to extract internal
data values processed by the embedded software. We identify
three different attackers, distinguished by the abstraction level
they operate on. The input-output attacker manipulates the data
inputs of an embedded software application to trigger internal
buffer overflows or internal software bugs in the application.
The memory attacker co-exists with the embedded software
application, for example as a malicious software task, and
snoops the memory space in order to directly manipulate or
observe a secure embedded application [1], [2]. Both of these
attackers succeed because they break an implicit assumption
made by the secure embedded software application. The input-
output attacker exploits the assumption that there are no
malformed inputs to the program. Using malformed inputs,
the attacker exploits bugs in secure embedded software such
as missing memory bounds checks. The memory attacker
exploits the assumption that memory space is private to the
secure embedded application. This privacy gets lost when the
architecture cannot provide memory region isolation to the
application [3]
The third type of attacker, the hardware fault attacker, is the
focus of this paper. Like the previous two, the hardware fault
attacker breaks an implicit assumption made by the secure
embedded software application. In this case, the assumption
is that the embedded hardware guarantees correct execution
of the software. Table I illustrates that the correct execution
of software builds on many interdependent assumptions at
different levels of abstraction in the hardware. Yet, any of the
abstraction levels is a potential target for the hardware fault
attacker.
• At the instruction-level, a programmer assumes that the
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TABLE I
EMBEDDED SOFTWARE TARGETS FOR THE HARDWARE ATTACKER
Abstraction Level Cause of Security Failure Attacker
Input/Output Software Bugs Input/Output Attacker
Application Level Lack of Memory Region Isolation Memory Attacker
Instruction Level Opcode modification Hardware Attacker
Micro-Architecture Level Instruction execution is wrong
Circuit Level Timing, Threshold Levels are not met
Environment Operating Conditions are abnormal
opcodes executed by the embedded hardware (the mi-
croprocessor) are correct. A hardware fault attacker who
can manipulate opcodes can change the meaning of a
program.
• At the micro-architecture level, a programmer assumes
that correct opcodes imply correct execution of the in-
struction. A hardware fault attacker who can manipulate
the micro-architecture can break this assumption and still
change the meaning of a program.
• At the circuit level, the correct execution of software re-
quires that digital logic in the processor will operate with
the proper timing, and using the proper voltage levels to
capture digital-0 and digital-1. A hardware fault attacker
who can influence circuit timing or logic threshold levels,
can change the correctness of digital execution and hence
still change the meaning of a program.
• At the lowest abstraction level, the correct execution
of software requires that the physical environment of a
digital circuit has nominal operating conditions, that it is
using the proper temperature, the proper circuit voltage,
and the proper electromagnetic environment. A hardware
fault attacker who can influence any of these parameters
can change the correctness of the architecture, and hence
still change the meaning of a program.
This paper is only concerned with the hardware fault
attacker, that is, an attacker who builds on the manipulation
of execution correctness at the architecture level or below.
We do not ignore side-channel attacks that build on the
observation of the physical effects of computing. In fact, some
of the recent fault attacks successfully combine ideas of side-
channel attacks with fault analysis. However, for this paper,
we consistently develop the viewpoint of the hardware fault
attacker as a threat to secure embedded software. An interested
reader may refer to the existing works [4], [5], [6], [7], [8] for
the viewpoint of the fault-resistant system designers.
It may appear as if a hardware attacker must be physically
close to the digital architecture to break execution correctness
(at any abstraction level). However, this is not always the
case. A hardware fault attacker can be a physical entity (in
hardware) or a virtual entity (in software). In the latter case,
the attacker is logically present as somebody who runs attack
software in conjunction with a victim program. Recent work
has shown that execution correctness of the hardware can be
manipulated by such a software attacker.
This paper addresses the following questions in detail.
• What are the common techniques for fault injection in a
digital architecture, and how do faults appear as a result
of fault injection?
• How do faults propagate through the micro-architecture
and across the architecture-level into the secure embedded
software?
• How does the attacker exploit these faults towards a fault
attack?
• What testing equipment can be used to study the fault in-
jection, propagation and exploitation of secure embedded
software?
This paper is organized as follows. In the next Section,
we develop a systematic threat model against embedded
software from the viewpoint of fault attacks, and we break
down a fault attack into smaller steps. In Section Three,
we describe commonly used fault injection techniques. In
Section Four, we investigate the impact of fault injection on
microprocessor execution. In Section Five, we analyze how
faults propagate from the micro-architecture into the embedded
software functionality. Section Six describes commonly used
fault exploitation techniques. Section Seven describes fault
attack evaluation technologies, and certification of embedded
software against fault attacks. We then conclude the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Threat Model
The aim of a fault attack is breaching the security of a
software program by forcing a security-sensitive asset into
unintended behavior. For this purpose, the adversary injects
well-crafted, targeted hardware faults by deliberately altering
the operating conditions of the microprocessor that runs the
target software. Then the adversary exploits the effects of
the faults on the target software’s execution and breaks the
security. Consequently, the target of exploitation is the soft-
ware layer while the origin of vulnerability (i.e, faults) is the
hardware layer.
In a typical fault attack, the adversary is not capable of
directly modifying or monitoring the internals of a chip, or
changing the binary of a program. The adversary is able to
alter the execution of a target program by controlling the
physical operating conditions (e.g, timing, supply voltage,
temperature) of the processor hardware executing the program.
The adversary can also provide input to the target program,
and observe the effects of abnormal operating conditions on
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Fig. 1. Anatomy of a typical fault attack on embedded software: The target of
fault injection is the hardware while the target of exploitation is the software.
the software execution through system output or a related side-
channel such as power consumption, cache-activity-related
timing, and performance counters.
B. Using Faults as a Hacking Tool
Figure 1 illustrates the steps and mechanisms involved in
a typical fault attack on embedded software. A fault attack
consists of two main phases, fault attack design and fault attack
implementation (Steps 1-5 in Fig. 1). In the design step, the
adversary analyzes the target to determine fault model (i.e,
an assumption on the faults to be injected), fault exploitation
method, and fault injection technique. For instance, an adver-
sary may intend to inject faults into several assets such as
an encryption program, a security-related verification code, a
memory transfer function, the processor state register, a system
call, the firmware, or configuration information of the target
device. The adversary may then exploit the fault effects on the
target asset for various attack objectives such as weakening the
security, bypassing security checks, intellectual property theft,
extracting the confidential data, privilege escalation, activating
debug modes, and disabling secure boot of the device.
The implementation phase is a combination of five steps:
1) Fault Injection: In this step, the adversary applies a
physical stress on the microprocessor to alter its physical
operating conditions and to induce hardware faults. The
applied physical stress can be in various forms such as
clock glitches, supply voltage glitches, electromagnetic
(EM) pulses, and laser shots.
To induce the desired faults, the adversary varies fault
timing and fault intensity. Fault timing specifies when
the physical stress is applied on the target processor.
Fault intensity is the degree of the physical stress by
which the microprocessor hardware is pushed beyond its
nominal operating conditions. The adversary controls the
fault intensity via fault injection parameters. For clock
glitching, shortening the length of the glitch increases
the fault intensity. It is controlled by glitch/pulse voltage
and length for voltage glitching, electromagnetic pulse
injection, and laser pulse injection. The laser and elec-
tromagnetic pulse injections also enable the adversary
to localize the fault intensity by controlling the shape,
size, and position of the injection probe.
2) Fault Manifestation: The circuit-level effect of fault
injection is creating electrical transients on the nets,
combinational gates, flip-flops, or memory cells. A fault
manifests at the micro-architecture level when the elec-
trical transients are captured into a memory cell or flip-
flop, and change its value.
The number of manifested faulty bits in the micro-
architecture level is correlated to the applied fault in-
tensity: A gradual change in the fault intensity causes a
gradual change in the manifested faults. We call this
relation biased fault behavior. This behavior is valid
independent of the used fault injection method, and it
enables the adversary to control the size (e.g, single-
byte) of the induced faults [9], [10], [11]. However,
tuning the fault intensity alone is not sufficient to control
the type (e.g, bit-set) and location (e.g, decode logic)
of the induced faults. The adversary’s control on the
fault type and location is also affected by the type and
precision of the fault injection equipment.
The biased fault behavior also allows the adversary
to find a critical fault intensity value, at which the
electrical transients become strong enough to cause fault
manifestation. That critical fault intensity value is called
fault sensitivity of the target hardware [12].
3) Fault Propagation: In this step, the effects of the
manifested faults are propagated to the software layer
through execution of faulty instructions. The next two
paragraphs briefly explain the mechanism behind fault
propagation.
Software security mechanisms are implemented as a
sequence of instructions executed by the microprocessor
hardware. In addition, each instruction goes through
the instruction-execution cycle that consists of multiple
steps carried out by a certain subset of available micro-
architecture-level hardware blocks. The processor loads
each instruction from program memory (instruction-
fetch), then determines the meaning of the current in-
struction through its opcode (instruction-decode), then
executes the current instruction (instruction-execution),
and then updates the state of the processor based on
the instruction’s result (instruction-store). The number
of steps in the instruction-execution cycle is architec-
ture dependent, and it can vary considerably from one
microprocessor to the next.
The manifested faults may cause faulty bits in any
micro-architectural hardware block such as instruction
memory, controller, datapath and register file. The effects
of the manifested faults are propagated to the soft-
ware layer when an instruction uses the affected micro-
architectural block. As each instruction uses a specific
subset of the micro-architectural blocks, the precise
effect of a hardware fault depends on the type of the
instruction. For instance, a bit-flip fault injected during
the execution step of an addition instruction may yield a
single-bit fault in the result of this instruction. However,
the same bit-flip fault injected during a memory-load
instruction would cause a single-bit fault in the effective
address calculation, and thus, data is loaded from a
wrong memory location. In the former case, only a
single bit of the destination register is faulty; while in the
latter case the destination register has a random number
of faulty bits.
4) Fault Observation: An adversary needs to observe the
effects faulty instructions in order to exploit them. An
observable fault effect can be a faulty system output
such as a faulty ciphertext, a side-channel information
such as a sudden change in the power consumption, a
single-bit information showing if fault injection was suc-
cessful, or micro-architectural effects observed through
performance counters [7], [13]. These effects become
observable to the adversary when they are subsequent
instructions that have data-dependencies or control-
dependencies on the faulty instruction are executed.
5) Fault Exploitation: In the final step, the adversary ex-
ploits the observable fault effects and breaks the security.
For example, the adversary can analyze the differential
of the correct and faulty ciphertexts from a cipher to
retrieve the secret key used for the encryption. For the
same purpose, an adversary may also use a single-
bit side-channel information of whether fault injection
was successful. Similarly, the adversary may use the
faults to trigger traditional logical attacks such as buffer
overflows and privilege escalation.
III. FAULT INJECTION TECHNIQUES
In a fault attack, it is essential to induce well-controlled
faults during execution of the target software. An adversary
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Fig. 2. Fault Injection Categories: (a) Hardware-Controlled Fault Injection
(b) Software-Controlled Fault Injection
achieves fault injection by deliberately applying physical
stress to push the operating conditions of the underlying
microprocessor hardware beyond their allowed margins. The
adversary controls the induced faults through timing, location,
and intensity of fault injection. The timing of fault injection is
defined as the moment at which physical stress is applied to
the processor. The location of the fault injection is the spatial
portion of the processor that is exposed to physical stress. The
intensity of the fault injection is the amount of physical stress
applied to the processor.
This section discusses common techniques used for fault
injection. We briefly describe main characteristics of each fault
injection technique. We partition the fault injection techniques
into two main categories (Figure 2): Hardware-controlled fault
injection and software-controlled fault injection.
Hardware-controlled fault injection techniques employ a
separate external fault injection hardware to apply physical
stress to the target hardware and induce faults in the victim
software. Typically, the fault injection process is controlled
by another software program (i.e, fault control software)
running on the fault injection hardware. In software controlled
fault injection techniques, fault injection is controlled with a
malicious software (i.e, fault injection and control software),
which runs on the same hardware platform as the target
software does. This malicious software alters the physical
operating conditions of the target hardware to induce faults.
While hardware-controlled techniques require physical prox-
imity to the target system, software-controlled fault injection
techniques enable remote fault attacks.
A. Hardware-controlled Fault Injection Techniques
Several hardware-controlled fault injection techniques have
been successfully demonstrated in the literature [14], [7]. The
following sections provide an example list of commonly used
techniques.
1) Tampering with Clock Pin: An adversary may inject
faults by tampering with the external clock signal of the target
device.
One way of exploiting the clock signal for fault injection
is overclocking [15], in which the adversary persistently ap-
plies a higher-frequency clock signal than the nominal clock
frequency of the device. This violates setup-time constraints
of the device and causes premature latching of the faulty
values in flip-flops of the device [16]. The spatial precision of
this method is low because the modifications in the external
clock signal are distributed across the whole chip surface
through a clock network. Similarly, the temporal precision
of overclocking is also low because all of the clock cycles
are affected by fault injection; the adversary cannot select the
clock cycles to be affected by the fault injection. On the other
hand, the adversary has a fine control on the fault intensity
through clock frequency.
Another way of tampering with the clock signal is clock
glitching [17], in which the adversary temporarily shortens
the length of a single clock cycle. This causes setup-time
violations during the affected clock cycle. In comparison
to overclocking, the adversary has a precise control on the
temporal location (i.e, timing) of the fault injection. The
intensity of the fault injection is controlled through the length
of the glitched clock cycle. Similar to the overclocking, the
spatial precision of clock glitching is low.
For the clock glitching and overclocking techniques,
the state-of-the-art fault injection setups [18], [19] provide
nanosecond-level temporal precision. The disadvantage of
tampering with the clock signal is that this method requires
physical access to an external clock pin. If a device uses
an internally-generated clock signal, using this method is
infeasible.
2) Tampering with Supply Voltage Pin: An adversary can
also inject faults by altering the external supply voltage of the
target device. The adversary may use underfeeding [20], in
which a lower voltage than the nominal voltage is supplied
to the device. Lower supply voltage increases the delay of
combinational paths. This causes setup-time violation when
the voltage drop is large enough to make a path delay larger
than the applied clock period. This method has low spatial
precision as the supply voltage is distributed all over the chip
through a power network. Similarly, the temporal precision of
the fault injection is low because all of the clock cycles are
exposed to the lower supply voltage. The adversary controls
the fault intensity through the value of the external supply
voltage.
The adversary can also use voltage glitching [21], which
injects temporary voltage drops and provides the capability
to control the temporal location of the fault injection. In this
case, the adversary controls the intensity with the glitch offset
from the sampling edge of the clock signal, glitch voltage, and
glitch width similar to the clock glitching.
These methods require physical access to the supply voltage
pin. Removing the external coupling capacitance on the supply
voltage line improves the efficiency [21]. The drawback of
tampering with external voltage pin is that the adversary does
not have precise control on the timing and location of the fault
injection.
3) Tampering with Operating Temperature: An adversary
may also use overheating to trigger setup-time violations [16],
[22] for fault injection. In this method, the adversary does not
have precise control on the spatial and temporal location of
the fault injection. The intensity of fault injection is controlled
via operating temperature of the target device.
In addition to the setup-time violation on the datapath,
overheating also causes modification in memory cells in
EEPROM [23], Flash [23], and DRAM [24] memories. While
Govindavajhala et al. [24] use a low-spatial-precision light
bulb as the heating source, Skorobogatov [23] employs a
650nm-wavelength laser to increase the spatial precision of
heating.
4) Combination of Voltage, Frequency, and Temperature
Fault Injection: Zussa et al. [16] demonstrated that over-
clocking, clock glitching, voltage glitching, underfeeding, and
overheating exploit the same fault injection mechanism, which
is the violation of a device’s setup-time constraints. In addi-
tion, Korak et al. [17], [25] showed overheating and voltage
glitching improves the efficiency of clock glitching.
5) Optical Fault Injection: In optical fault injection, the
adversary decapsulates the target integrated circuit (IC) and
exposes the silicon die to a light pulse. The applied light pulse
induces a photo-electric current in the exposed area of the
IC, which then cause faulty computations [26]. The spatial
location is controlled by the position and the size of the light
source, and the temporal location is controlled by the offset
of the pulse from a trigger signal. The intensity of the fault
injection is determined by the energy and duration of the light
pulse. It has been demonstrated that optical fault injection
can be achieved with a low-cost camera flash light [27], [26].
The state-of-the-art optical fault injection setups [28] use laser
beams for fault injection to achieve micrometer-level spatial
and nanosecond-level temporal precision. They also provide
precise control on the fault intensity. This enables an adversary
to target a single transistor. Laser fault injection can be done
from front side and back side of an IC. Front side attacks
typically use light with shorter wavelengths. These beams have
more energy, and can easily penetrate between metal layers.
Back side attacks use infrared light that penetrates the silicon
substrate without being blocked by metal layers.
A disadvantage of the optical fault injection is that it
requires decapsulation of the target IC. In addition, it can
permanently damage the target IC. Despite these disadvantages
laser fault injection is popular because it provides the most
precise and effective fault injection means.
6) Electromagnetic Fault Injection: In electromagnetic
fault injection (EMFI), the adversary applies transient or har-
monic EM pulses on the target integrated circuit (IC) through a
fault injection probe, which is designed as an electromagnetic
coil. The adversary places the probe above the target IC and
applies a voltage pulse to the coil, which induces eddy currents
inside the target IC. Then the effects of the induced eddy
currents are captured as faults. The adversary controls the
temporal location of fault injection through offset of the EM
pulse from a trigger signal. The spatial location of the fault
injection is controlled via position and size of the injection
probe. The fault intensity is determined by the voltage and
duration of the applied EM pulse. The feasibility of EMFI on
off-the-shelf microprocessor ICs has been demonstrated using
both low-cost and high-cost injection setups. For instance,
Schmidt et al. [27] use a simple gas lighter to induce EM
pulses onto an 8-bit microcontroller with low spatial and tem-
poral precision. The state-of-the-art EMFI setups [29], [30],
[31] provide millimeter-level precision in spatial location and
nanosecond-level precision in the temporal location of the EM
pulse. Furthermore, these setups also provide precise control
on the voltage and duration of the applied EM pulse. The
advantages of EMFI is that it does not require decapsulation of
the target IC and it can inject local faults. However, its spatial
precision is lower than the spatial precision of the laser fault
injection.
B. Software-controlled Fault Injection Techniques
Software-controlled fault injection is a recently discovered
research area. The following two sections briefly explain the
existing two software-controlled fault injection techniques.
1) Tampering with DVFS Interface: In the modern embed-
ded systems, Dynamic Voltage Frequency Scaling is a com-
monly used energy management technique, which regulates
the operating voltage and frequency of a microprocessor based
on its dynamic workload. In a typical DVFS scheme, kernel-
level drivers control the frequency and voltage of a processor
through on-chip regulators.
Tang et al. [32] demonstrated that an adversary can ex-
ploit the interface between the software drivers and hardware
regulators to induce faults in a multi-core processor. In this
technique, the adversary uses a malicious kernel-level driver
running on a processor core to set the operating voltage and
frequency of another core that executes the victim software.
This method allows an adversary to violate setup time con-
straints of the victim core via overclocking and underfeeding
it for a specific period of time. The adversary controls the
temporal location with the endpoints of the overclocking or
underfeeding period. As both the clock and voltage signals
are chip-level global signals, the adversary does not have a
direct control on the spatial location. The intensity of fault is
determined by the overclocking frequency and the underfeed-
ing voltage value. This method requires neither additional fault
injection hardware nor physical access to the target device.
2) Triggering Memory Disturbance Errors: In this fault
injection method, the adversary injects faults into memory
cells by exploiting the reliability issues of modern memory
hardware such as DRAM and Flash memory chips. The
continuous scaling down in the process technology has enabled
memory manufacturers to significantly reduce cost-per-bit by
placing smaller memory cells closer to each other. However,
this also increases electrical interference between memory
cells: Accessing a memory cell electrically disturbs nearby
memory cells. A disturbed memory cell loses its value and
experiences a memory disturbance error when the amount of
electrical disturbance is beyond noise margins of that disturbed
cell [33], [34].
An adversary may trigger memory disturbance errors
through a non-privileged fault injection program. This program
repeatedly accesses a set of memory cells (i.e, aggressor
memory cells) to induce disturbance errors in a set of victim
memory cells storing security-sensitive data. This method
allows an adversary to corrupt memory space of a security-
sensitive program from memory space of the adversary-
controlled fault injector program. Memory disturbance errors
have been demonstrated on commodity DRAM and NAND
Flash memory chips [33].
In DRAM memories, the memory disturbance errors are
induced through Rowhammer mechanism [34]. Thus, it is
called Rowhammering. A DRAM memory is internally orga-
nized as a two-dimensional array of DRAM cells, where each
cell consists of an access transistor and a capacitor storing
charge to represent a binary value. As capacitors lose their
charges because of the leakage current, the DRAM cells are
periodically refreshed to restore their charges. Each row of the
array has a separate wordline, which is a wire connecting all
memory cells on the corresponding row. To access a DRAM
cell within the two-dimensional array, the corresponding row
of the array is activated by raising the voltage of its wordline.
Persistent access to the same row causes repeated voltage
fluctuations on its wordline, which electrically disturbs nearby
rows. This disturbance increases the charge leakage rate in
the nearby DRAM rows [34]. As a result, a memory cell
within a nearby row experiences a memory disturbance error
(a bit-flip error) if it loses a significant amount of charge
before it is refreshed. An adversary may take advantage of
that physical phenomenon to inject faults. For this purpose, the
adversary runs a malicious fault injection program on the target
processor, which aims at altering a security-sensitive state of
a victim program running on the same processor. The fault
injection program continuously accesses an aggressor DRAM
row in its own memory space and induces faults into a victim
DRAM row within the victim program’s memory space [35],
[36], [37].
Similar disturbance mechanisms have been also demon-
strated on multi-level cell (MLC) NAND Flash memories.
Similar to DRAM memory, a Flash memory is also internally
organized as an array of Flash memory cells, each of which
is a floating-gate transistor. The amount of charge stored
in the floating gate determines the threshold voltage of the
transistor, which is used to represent the stored data, In MLC
Flash memories, each cell stores two bits of data. Unlike
DRAM memories, Flash memories do not require periodic
refreshing. Cai et al. [33] demonstrated that the capacitive
coupling between neighboring Flash cells enables two memory
disturbance error mechanisms. The first mechanism, Cell-
to-Cell Program Interference (CCI), introduces faults into a
Flash cell when a nearby cell is programmed (i.e, written).
The amount of interference is high when a specific data
pattern for programming is used. Cai et al. [33] and Kurmus
et al. [38] showed how a malicious fault injection program
may trigger CCI mechanism to cause a security breach. The
second mechanism is Read-Disturb, in which the content of
a Flash cell is disturbed when a nearby cell is read. Cai et
al. [33] demonstrated the use of read-disturb to cause security
problems.
The advantage of fault injection by triggering memory
disturbance errors is that it can induce single-bit to multi-bit
TABLE II
FAULT INJECTION TECHNIQUES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CORRESPONDING PHYSICAL STRESS APPLIED TO A TARGET DEVICE
Fault Injection Technique Characteristics of the Applied Physical Stress
Spatial Precision Temporal Precision Cost Controlling the Intensity
Overclocking Low (Global) Low (Global) Low Clock Frequency
Clock Glitching Low (Global) High (Local) Low Glitch Width
Underfeeding Low (Global) Low (Global) Low Voltage Level
Voltage Glitching Low (Global) High (Local) Low Glitch Voltage
Glitch Width
Overheating Low (Global) Low (Global) Low Ambient Temperature
Light Pulse Medium (Local) Medium (Local) Low Pulse Width
Pulse Energy
Pulse Offset
Laser Pulse High (Local) High (Local) High Pulse Width
EM Pulse Medium (Local) Pulse Energy
Pulse Offset
Probe Size
DVFS interface Low (Global) Medium (Local) Zero Supply Voltage
Clock Frequency
Memory Disturbance High (Local) Medium (Local) Zero Disturbance Frequency
faults into a certain memory location [37]. This enables an
adversary to break several security mechanisms.
Table II summarizes the previously described fault injection
techniques and the main characteristics of the physical stress
applied to the target device. For each fault injection technique,
the table provides spatial precision, temporal precision, hard-
ware cost of the applied physical stress. The table also provides
a list of fault injection parameters to control the intensity of
the applied physical stress.
IV. FAULT MANIFESTATION IN PROCESSOR
MICRO-ARCHITECTURE
This section explains the effects of physical fault injection
on the micro-architecture of the target processor. First, we will
distinguish micro-architecture (i.e, internal architecture) of a
processor from its architecture (i.e, external architecture). Then
we will briefly explain main characteristics of the induced
faults into micro-architecture.
Any processor can be described from two distinct architec-
tural perspectives. The architecture of the processor describes
it as seen by programmers in terms of its instruction set and fa-
cilities. The architecture defines semantics and syntax of avail-
able instructions, program-visible processor registers, memory
model, and how interrupts are handled. It is the boundary
between hardware and software as well as a contract between
programmers and hardware designers. The micro-architecture
describes the physical organization and implementation of the
architecture. This includes the memory hierarchy, pipeline
structure, available functional units, employed mechanisms
(e.g, out-of-order execution) for instruction-level parallelism,
and so forth. The micro-architecture is optimized to satisfy
cost and performance requirements.
Faults manifest as incorrect bits in the flip-flops or memory
cells employed in the micro-architecture if the applied physical
stress is beyond noise margins of target processor hardware.
The parameters and type of physical fault injection technique
determine characteristics of the manifested faults. In this work,
we use four parameters to describe any manifested fault in
micro-architecture level:
• Location of the Manifested Fault: This parameter
specifies the micro-architectural blocks that contain faulty
bits because of physical fault injection.
Faults may manifest in any micro-architectural block in
the control or datapath part of the processor such as
instruction memory, instruction fetch block, instruction
decode block, operand fetch block, execution block, data
memory, register file, processor status register, and con-
ditional flags. An adversary’s control on the location of
the manifested faults depends on the spatial precision of
the used fault injection method, which is characterized as
precise control, loose control, and no control [39].
All of the previously described fault injection techniques,
except software-based memory disturbance, can target the
datapath, control, or memory of a processor. Memory
disturbance can only inject faults into the memory.
• Size of the Manifested Fault: This parameter specifies
the number of faulty micro-architecture bits induced by
physical fault injection. An adversary can control the size
of the manifested faults by adjusting the fault intensity. In
the literature, manifested faults are commonly classified
as single-bit faults, byte-size faults, word-size faults, and
arbitrary-size faults [40]. The adversary influences the
size of the manifested faults by tuning the fault injection
intensity.
• Effect of the Manifested Fault: This parameter specifies
the logical effect of the manifested fault on the fault
location. Common fault effects are stuck-at fault, bit-flip
fault, bit-set fault, bit-reset fault, and random fault [40].
All of the aforementioned fault injection techniques are
able to induce bit-flip effects. In addition, laser and EM
pulses are also able to induce bit-reset, bit-set, and stuck-
at faults.
• Duration of the Manifested Fault: Fault attacks typ-
ically exploit transient faults, which last as long as
the physical stress is applied. Such faults are recovered
when a new value is written into the faulty flip-flop
or the memory cell. However, if a register is refreshed
only infrequently, these faults can still last a long time.
Some fault attack injection techniques are able to create
long-lasting faults, such as recently demonstrated using
focused X-ray injection [41]. Some fault injection tech-
niques can even inject permanent faults, such as when
a laser pulse causes permanent damage to a memory or
register cell (stuck-at).
The next section explains how the manifested faults propa-
gate to the software layer.
V. FAULT PROPAGATION TO THE SOFTWARE LAYER
The manifested faults propagate to the software layer as
faulty instructions when the micro-architectural blocks con-
taining the faulty bits are used by the instructions of the
target program. Propagated fault effects are determined by the
type of affected instruction, type of faulty micro-architectural
block, and the characteristics (size, effect) of the manifested
faults. As each processor implementation has its own micro-
architecture, it is not possible to list all of the potential fault
effects propagated to software. Instead, we provide an example
to demonstrate a list of potential fault effects for a subset of
SPARC instructions running on a hypothetical generic micro-
architecture. Using the same approach, similar lists can be built
for specific instruction sets and processor implementations.
As an example, we chose four SPARCv8 instructions:
a memory-load (ld), a logic (xor), a comparison (cmp),
and a conditional branch (be) instruction. Table III lists the
instructions and their definitions.
The assumed generic micro-architecture contains the fol-
lowing blocks to carry out instruction-execution cycle for each
instruction:
• I-Mem Block is the instruction memory that stores the
instructions.
• I-Fetch Block prepares the address for the instruction
memory, program counter (PC). Then, using the prepared
PC, it fetches an instruction into the instruction register
(IR).
• I-Decode Block takes the fetched instruction from IR
and decodes it to determine the location of the source
operands, the location of destination operands, and the
TABLE III
AN EXAMPLE SET OF SPARCV8 INSTRUCTIONS
Instruction Definition
ld [r1+r2], r3 Loads a 32-bit word into register r3
from data memory (D-Mem) address r1+r2.
xor r1, r2, r3 Bit-wise XOR operation on r1 and r2
Result is written to register r3.
cmp r1, r2 Compares registers r1 and r2 and
updates conditional flags accordingly.
be offset PC-relative conditional jump:
If zero-flag is set, PC will be PC + offset.
Otherwise, PC will be PC + 4.
operation to be applied. The source operands are fetched
from the register file. The destination may be the register
file, data memory (D-Mem), or conditional flags.
• O-Fetch Block uses the decoded information to fetch the
input operands from the register file and to feed them to
the execution block. The be instruction does not use this
block because it does not fetch any operand from the
register file.
• Execute Block applies the required operation on the
fetched source operands and generates a result. For ld,
it calculates the D-Mem address from r1 and r2. For
xor, it applies bitwise XOR operation on r1 and r2.
For cmp, it subtracts r2 from r1. For be, it calculates
the destination address from the current PC and offset.
It also checks the conditional flags to determine if the
branch will be taken.
• Store Block updates the destination location (D-Mem,
register file, or flags) with the result computed by the
execution block. For the ld and xor, it is the register
r3. For the cmp instruction, the destination is conditional
flags. For the be instruction, the destination is the PC
value if the branch is taken. Otherwise, it will not affect
any destination.
Table IV provides an example list of propagated fault effects
for each (instruction, micro-architecture block) pair. In this
example, we assume a single bit-flip fault in any micro-
architectural block. A fault induced in I-Memory, I-Fetch, or
I-Decode block would affect syntax (i.e, opcode and operands)
and/or semantics (i.e, the operation to be applied) of an
instruction independent from the type of the instruction. Thus,
Table IV shows the propagated fault effects for these blocks in
a single cell. Faults induced in the other blocks would cause
errors in the instruction-specific computation of a correctly
fetched and decoded instruction:
• I-Mem, I-Fetch, I-Decode: If the fault manifests in the
opcode part of the faulty instruction, another instruction
will be executed. If the fault affects the addresses of
source operands, they will be fetched from an incor-
rect location. Similarly, the result of an instruction will
be written into a wrong location if the fault hits the
destination address. Finally, the next instruction will be
fetched from an incorrect location if the PC calculation
TABLE IV
PROPAGATED EFFECTS TO SOFTWARE LAYER FOR EACH FAULTY MICRO-ARCHITECTURAL BLOCK (WITH 1-BIT FAULT) AND INSTRUCTION
Faulty Block Propagated Fault Effects
(1-bit Fault) ld [r1+r2], r3 xor r1, r2, r3 cmp r1, r2 be dest
I-Mem Execution of a wrong instruction due to opcode-field corruption
I-Fetch (PC, IR) Fetching operands from wrong location due to source-operand-location corruption
I-Decode Updating a wrong destination due to destination-operand-location corruption
Fetching next instruction from a wrong address due to PC corruption
O-Fetch Arbitrary # of faults in r3 1-bit fault in r3 Faulty update No
(1-bit fault in r1 or r2) (Faulty D-Memory address) (Faulty XOR input(s)) of conditional flags effect
Execute Arbitrary # of faults in r3 1-bit fault in r3 Faulty update 1-bit fault in jump address
(Faulty D-Memory address) (Faulty XOR operation) of conditional flags or Inversion of branch
Store 1-bit fault in r3 1-bit fault in r3 Faulty update 1-bit fault in jump address
(Faulty update of [r1+r2]) (Faulty update of r3) of conditional flags
D-Mem No effect
Register File Fetching wrong source operands from register file No effect
Conditional Flags No effect No jump to dest
gets faulty.
• O-Fetch: For the ld instruction, a single-bit fault in
this block affects the value of register r1 or r2 fetched
from register file. The fault then causes D-Mem address
to be faulty. As a result, a single-bit fault in either r1
or r2 may induce an arbitrary number of faults in the
destination register r3 because the result will be fetched
from an incorrect D-Mem location.
For the xor instruction, the fault will affect a single bit of
r1 or r2, which will be propagated to r3 as a single-bit
fault.
For the cmp instruction, the single-bit fault may affect the
result of the comparison, which will alter the conditional
flags based on the modified comparison result.
For the be instruction, the fault will not have any effect
because this instruction does not fetch anything from the
register file.
• Execute: For the ld, xor, and cmp instructions, the
effects of the fault will be same as the effects described
in the O-Fetch case.
For the be instruction, the fault will change the single-bit
of the computed branch address. If the branch is taken, the
destination address will be wrong. Otherwise, the faulty
branch address will not affect the program. The fault may
also change the direction of the branch instruction from
taken branch to non-taken branch, or vice versa.
• Store: For the ld instruction, the fault will cause a
single-bit error in the correctly computed D-Mem address
[r1+r2]. For, the xor, and cmp instructions, the effects
of the fault will be same as the effects described in the
O-Fetch case. For the be instruction the fault will change
the value of the PC if it is a taken branch.
• D-Mem: As none of the instructions use a value from
the data memory, the fault in D-Mem will not affect any
of the considered instructions.
• Register File: For the ld, xor, and cmp instructions, the
effects of the fault will be same as the effects described in
the O-Fetch case. As the be instruction does not use this
block, the fault will not have any effect on this instruction.
• Conditional Flags: The fault in conditional flags will
affect only the be instruction as the other instructions do
not use the conditional flags.
VI. FAULT EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES
This section presents main fault exploitation techniques,
which have been proposed to break the security of both crypto-
graphic and non-cryptographic security mechanisms protecting
embedded software. Each exploitation technique relies on a
fault model, which is a high-level assumption for the effects of
physical fault injection on the execution of the target software.
Thus, we start with commonly used fault models in practice.
Then we will briefly explain fault exploitation techniques.
A. Fault Models
In the design phase of a fault attack, an adversary makes a
fault model assumption and develops an exploitation strategy
based on the fault model. This assumption generally includes
the location of the fault in the data or control flow of the target
program, the timing of the fault with respect to the duration of
the target program, size of the fault, and effect of the fault. The
fault models can be described in algorithm level, source code
level, or instruction level. The following paragraphs provide
an example list of commonly used fault models.
The most of fault-based cryptanalysis techniques on sym-
metric and asymmetric cryptography assume faults on data
flow of a target program that corrupt a single bit, single byte,
multiple bytes, or a single word of a security-critical variable
in various ways (e.g, flip, set, reset, random) [6], [7], [40].
On the control flow, the most popular fault models are
to skip the execution of a specific instruction (i.e, instruc-
tion skip) [42], [43], multiple instruction skips [44], [45],
replacing an instruction with another one (i.e, instruction
modification) [46], [21], changing the result of a conditional
branch [47], [48], and tampering with loop counters [49], [50].
In the implementation of a fault attack, the adversary aims
at inducing the fault effects assumed in the fault model
Fig. 3. Propagation of a single bit flip fault through the last round of AES.
The fault causes a single faulty byte in the ciphertext.
via fault injection, fault manifestation, and fault propagation
processes. Therefore, a fault model can be realized through
different combinations of fault injection, fault manifestation,
and fault propagation. The following sections provide a list
of commonly used fault exploitation techniques to breach the
security of embedded software.
B. Cryptanalysis using Fault Injection
Using fault injection for cryptanalysis has been extensively
studied on the implementations of symmetric-key, public-key,
and post-quantum cryptography algorithms [6], [39], [14],
[40], [7].
a) Differential Fault Analysis (DFA): is the most widely
used fault-based cryptanalysis technique. The main principle
of DFA is to exploit the difference between the faulty and
fault-free outputs of a cryptosystem. In a typical DFA attack,
an adversary collects two outputs (e.g, ciphertexts) from a
cryptosystem (e.g, encryption) that are generated for the same
input (e.g, plaintext) and secret variable (e.g, encryption key).
One of the outputs is collected without fault injection. During
the generation of the second output, the adversary injects a
certain fault into the execution of the cryptosystem. Then the
adversary analyzes the propagation of this fault differential to
the output and reveals the secret variable. DFA attacks assume
specific fault during differential analysis of the faulty and fault-
free outputs. Various DFA techniques have been successfully
demonstrated on block ciphers [51], stream ciphers [52],
public-key algorithms [53], [7], and post-quantum cryptogra-
phy [54]. To illustrate how the DFA works, the following two
paragraphs briefly explain a previously proposed DFA attack
on Advanced Standard Encryption (AES) algorithm.
In this example attack [55], the assumed fault model is a
single bit flip in the input of the last AES round. Figure 3
shows the propagation of a single bit fault through the last
round of AES. Due to the structure of AES, the single bit flip
(v*) is propagated to the ciphertext as a single fault byte (c*).
For the fault-free (c) and faulty (c*) ciphertexts, we can write
c = SBOX(v) ⊕ k
c* = SBOX(v*) ⊕ k
∆ = v ⊕ v*
where ∆ denotes the injected fault differential. The adversary
is able to observe the values of c* and c. As the assumed
fault model is to flip a single bit of v, the Hamming Weight
(HW) of the injected fault differential ∆ is assumed to be
1. The purpose of the adversary is to reveal the value of the
corresponding byte (k) of the last round key. The adversary
achieves this through an exhaustive search on the possible
key values. For each possible key hypothesis k˜ for actual key
byte k, the adversary first computes the corresponding fault
differential ∆˜ as follows:
v˜ = SBOX−1(c ⊕ k˜)
v˜* = SBOX
−1(c* ⊕ k˜)
∆˜ = v˜ ⊕ v˜*
The adversary then checks whether the computed (i.e, hypoth-
esized) differential ∆˜ is equal to the injected (i.e, assumed)
differential ∆. For our example, the hypothesized key k˜ is a
possible candidate for the actual key k if the Hamming weight
of ∆˜ is 1. Otherwise, the hypothesized key k˜ is discarded.
After testing all of the possible key hypotheses, the set
of possible key candidates contains 8 elements on the av-
erage [56]. Therefore, two fault injection experiments on a
given input byte of the AES last round reveals the value of the
corresponding byte of the AES last round key. The remaining
bytes of the last round key can be revealed by repeating the
same steps for the remaining input bytes of the last round.
As a result, the explained attack requires 32 fault injection
experiments to retrieve the whole 16-byte last-round key of
AES-128. The adversary can then calculate other round keys
by applying AES key scheduling algorithm on the retrieved
last round key. For further information on the DFA techniques
and their comparison, the reader may refer to existing works
in the literature [57], [58], [7].
b) Biased Fault Analysis: attacks [59], [60], [61], [62],
[63] exploit biased fault behavior: Because of the correlation
between the fault behavior of a target program and the applied
physical fault intensity, the distribution of fault models is non-
uniform. They allow an adversary to treat fault behavior as
a side-channel signal, which relaxes the strict fault model
requirements of the previous attacks [12]. As an example of
biased fault analysis, we will demonstrate Differential Fault
Intensity Analysis (DFIA) on AES, which was proposed by
Ghalaty et al. [59].
Similar to the previous DFA example, the DFIA assumes
faults in the input of the AES last round. Unlike DFA attacks,
DFIA does not make a precise assumption on the injected
faults. Instead, DFIA assumes that the injected faults are
biased: The adversary adjusts the fault intensity during the
fault injection step such that the number of faulty bits in the
input of the last AES round (v) is minimal. For this specific
DFIA attack, it is assumed that the number of faulty bits in
the input byte v is less than 4 [59]. DFIA retrieves the value
of the corresponding key byte as follows. The adversary first
computes the fault differential ∆˜ for each key hypothesis k˜. If
the correct key hypothesis is made, the Hamming weight of the
hypothesized fault differential δ˜ is small (i.e, HW (δ˜) < 4).
Under a wrong key hypothesis, the expected Hamming weight
of the fault differential is large because of highly non-linear
design of SBOX of AES.
It is possible that a single fault is insufficient to uniquely
determine the correct key. In that case, the adversary can
inject multiple biased faults, under a gradually increasing fault
intensity, each time recording the faulty ciphertext c*. For each
key hypothesis k˜ and injected fault, the adversary computes the
hamming weight of the corresponding fault differential. For
the correct key hypothesis, the sum of all Hamming weights
is still minimal [59]. Ghalaty et al. demonstrated that, on the
average, DFIA requires 4.6 faults to retrieve one byte of the
last round key and 68 faults to retrieve all bytes of it. In
conclusion, DFIA relaxes fault model requirements and more
suitable than DFA when fault injection is hard to control.
c) Safe Error Analysis (SEA): attacks exploit the de-
pendence between the use of a faulty data and the value of
a secret variable[64]. An adversary first identifies a target
intermediate variable, of which use depends on the value of a
secret variable. Then the adversary injects a specific fault into
the target variable and observes whether the output is faulty
or not. If the output is faulty, it means that the faulty target
variable is used and the secret variable has a specific value.
The advantage of the SEA is that it requires only a single-bit
information from fault observation: If the faulty value has been
used or not. Fault injection may be used to check if a specific
computation is executed (C-safe errors [65]) or if a specific
memory location is accessed (M-safe errors [66]). SEA attacks
have been successfully demonstrated on symmetric-key [67],
[7] and public-key [65], [7] algorithms. Yen and Joye describe
a form of safe-error analysis that is based on collisions
[65]. By forcing a value on an intermediate value with data
dependency on the output, and by checking if the output is
affected or not, a collision between the forced value and the
original secret value can be detected. For this reason, for
example, write-only cryptographic key registers should never
allow partial update, otherwise the attacker can test a partial
key guess by detecting these collisions.
d) Algorithm-specific Fault Analysis: uses fault injec-
tion to exploit algorithm-specific properties. For instance, the
public-key cryptography algorithms such as RSA and ECC
rely on a hard-to-solve mathematical problem. An adversary
may use fault injection to alter the mathematical foundations
of the problem and convert the problem into an easy-to-solve
one.
In the infamous Bellcore Attack, Boneh et al. demonstrate
that the security of the RSA cryptosystem can be broken with
a single faulty computation [68]. In the RSA, a message M
is signed by computing S = MdmodN , where d is the
secret exponent and N = pq is a product of two large prime
integers. The security of the system relies on the difficulty of
factoring the modulus N . An efficient implementation of RSA
is RSA-CRT, in which S1 = xdmodp and S2 = xdmodq
are computed first and then the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) is used to combine S1 and S2 to obtain S = MdmodN .
In the Bellcore Attack, a single random fault is assumed in
the computation of either S1 or S2. If a fault occurs during
the computation of S1, the modulus N can be easily factored
using the equation gcd(S − Sˆ) = q. In this equation, S
and Sˆ denote the fault-free and faulty signatures, respectively.
Similar algorithm-specific analysis attacks have been mounted
on several public-key systems including RSA and ECC [69],
[70], [7].
C. Using Fault Injection to Assist Side-Channel Analysis
Another use of fault injection is to assist side-channel
analysis for reducing the complexity of side-channel attacks or
thwarting the countermeasures. Side-Channel Analysis, intro-
duced by Kocher et al. [71], is a major category of the imple-
mentation attacks used for cryptanalysis of secure embedded
software. While fault attacks actively manipulate the physical
operating conditions of a target device, side-channel attacks
exploit physical leakage (e.g, power consumption, electro-
magnetic radiation, etc.) emanating from the device during
a security-critical operation. Side channel attacks are usually
partitioned into two categories. Simple Side-Channel Analysis
(SSCA) exploits a single observation of the physical leakage
of the device during a cryptographic operation. Differential
Side-Channel Analysis (DSCA) collects multiple observations
of the physical leakage and retrieves the secret information by
applying statistical tests on these observations. In the last 20
years, various SSCA and DSCA methods have been demon-
strated on all forms of cryptography [72], [73], [74]. Similarly,
developing countermeasures against SSCA and DSCA attacks
have been extensively investigated [4], [75], [76], [77], [78].
The advancements in the countermeasure design motivated
fault-assisted side-channel attacks, which utilize fault injection
to break the security of systems protected against SCAs.
In 2006, Skorobogatov [79] used a laser source to illuminate
a specific area of an SRAM memory to increase the side-
channel leakage of the illuminated area. In 2007, Amiel et
al. [80] proposed a fault-assisted side-channel attack on an
RSA implementation resistant to both side-channel and fault
attacks. In this attack, the injected fault modifies a secret
variable such that the modified variable leaks information
via SSCA. A similar attack was also developed by Clavier
et al. [81] on an AES implementation protected with first-
order masking, a DSCA countermeasure. Roche et al. [82]
also demonstrated a combined attack on an high-order masked
and DFA-resistant AES implementation. Based on the work of
Roche et al. [82], Dassance et al. [83] developed combined at-
tacks on the key schedule of a protected AES implementation.
In 2010, Schmidt et al. [84] both demonstrated novel fault-
assisted side-channel attacks and countermeasures on them.
Later, Feix et al. proposed novel attacks that are capable of
breaking the countermeasures proposed by Schmidt et al. [84].
In 2018, Yao et al. [85] proposed a fault-assisted side-channel
attack that utilize fault injection to weaken a DSCA-resistant
masking scheme and breaking its security with a first-order
DSCA.
D. Fault-Enabled Logical Attacks
In addition to their use in cryptanalysis, fault attacks can
also be used to trigger logical attacks (e.g, control flow
hijacking, privilege escalation, subverting memory isolation,
etc.) on smartcards and general-purpose processors. Classic
logical attacks such as buffer overflow tamper with the inputs
of a program to exploit a security bug in the implementation
of the program. A well-known example is the HeartBleed
bug [86]. In the absence of such an exploitable software
bug, it is not possible for an adversary to mount a logical
attack by just modifying inputs. In such a case, an adversary
can inject faults to dynamically create required conditions to
mount a logical attack. A straightforward application of this
idea are attacks on input/output routines, which copy a portion
of an internal memory region to the outputs of the chip.
By glitching the end condition of the input/output routine,
an adversary can force dumping of the entire internal data
memory region, rather than just the portion allocated to the
input/output buffer. Similarly, an attacker can also utilize fault
injection to dump the source/binary code of the target program
in case the code is normally not available to the attacker [87],
[88]. This enables the attacker to analyze the source/binary
code for identifying and subsequently exploiting the software
vulnerabilities. The following paragraphs briefly explain fault-
enabled logical attack examples from the literature.
Barbu et al. [42] demonstrated two fault-enabled logical
attacks on a Java card. In the demonstrated attacks, the
adversary uses a laser-induced instruction-skip model to create
type confusion. Then the adversary exploits the induced type
confusion to load an unverified adversary-controlled code on
the Java Card. Type confusion also enables an adversary to
access other applications’ memory space. Vetillard et al. [47]
and Bouffard et al. [89] also demonstrates similar attacks on
Java Card, in which they employed fault injection to bypass
run-time security checks and execute malicious code on the
platform.
The first fault-enabled fault attack on a general-purpose
processor has been demonstrated by Govindavajhala et al. [24].
In the demonstrated attack, the adversary designs and runs
a software program on a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) on a
desktop computer. The malicious program is designed such
that a bit error in the data space of the program allows
the adversary take full control over JVM. To induce those
exploitable faults, the authors overheat the memory chips.
Nashimoto et al. [45] proposed a fault-enabled buffer over-
flow (BOF) attack on a buffer overflow countermeasure, which
limits input size. The authors demonstrated the proposed attack
on an 8-bit AVR ATmega163 and a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M0+
microcontroller. Their fault models were single and multiple
instruction-skip, which are induced by clock glitching.
Timmers et al. [21] demonstrated two ARM-specific, fault-
enabled logical attacks which are based on setting the program
counter (PC) of a microprocessor to an adversary-controlled
value. The authors alter the execution of a memory-load
instruction (i.e, instruction replacement) via voltage glitching
to set PC to an adversary-controlled value. The authors provide
two case studies to demonstrate the use of such an attack. In
the first case, the authors bypass a secure-boot mechanism
and run their own unverified program on the processor. In
the second case, the authors subvert the hardware-enforced
isolation mechanism of a Trusted Execution Environment
(TEE) and run their code program with the highest privileges
on the processor.
Vasselle et al. [90] demonstrated a fault-enabled logical
attack on a Quad-core ARM Cortex-A9 processor, which
bypasses secure boot mechanism and allows an adversary to
get highest privileges on the processor. The authors achieved
privilege escalation by resetting the privilege-level-specifying
bit of the Secure Configuration Register of the processor via
laser fault injection.
Timmers et al. [91] proposed three fault-attack enabled
logical attacks on a Linux Kernel to gain kernel-level execu-
tion privileges. The authors demonstrated their attacks on an
ARM Cortex-A9 processor through voltage glitching. In the
demonstrated attacks, the authors request system calls from
the user space, and then, inject faults during the execution
of system calls for privilege escalation. The gained privileges
may allow an adversary to run an arbitrary code on the device
and access the memory space of other applications.
The software-controlled fault injection methods such as
triggering memory disturbance errors broaden the scope of
fault attacks as they allow remote fault attacks. For example,
in Rowhammer attacks [34], an adversary-controlled program
(running in a user space) injects bit-flip faults into security-
sensitive DRAM memory cells by repeatedly accessing nearby
cells. In 2015, Seaborn [92] demonstrated two practical
Rowhammer attacks. The first attack induces bit-flips to escape
from Google Native Client (NaCl) sandbox. The second attack
use bit-flips in DRAM for privilege escalation. Gruss et
al. [35] successfully mounted a Rowhammer attack from web
browsers on four off-the-shelf laptops. Similarly, van der Veen
et al [36] achieved privilege escalation on Android-running
mobile platforms. Razavi [37] demonstrated a Rowhammer
attack in a cloud setting, in which a malicious virtual machine
induce memory disturbance errors to gain unauthorized access
to memory space of a co-hosted virtual machine. Kurmus
et al. [38] and Cai et al. [33] demonstrated that software-
controlled memory disturbance errors can be triggered on
Multi-cell (MLC) NAND Flash memories to mount fault-
enabled logical attacks.
Finally, Tang et al. [32] exploited security-oblivious dy-
namic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS) interface to in-
duce faults in a smartphone. They demonstrated two software-
controlled fault attacks. The first attack allows a malicious
user-space program to inject faults into the operation of an
encryption program running in Trustzone environment and to
reveal the value of secret key stored in Trustzone environment.
In the second attack, an adversary bypasses an authentication
mechanism running in Trustzone to load an unauthorized pro-
gram into Trustzone environment. These two attacks show that
fault injection may enable an adversary to subvert hardware-
enforced isolation mechanisms such as ARM Trustzone.
E. Using Fault Injection to Assist Reverse Engineering
Another potential use of fault injection is to assist reverse
engineering. San Pedro et al. [93], Le Bouder et al. [94],
and Clavier et al. [95] employed fault injection to reverse
engineer specifications of block ciphers similar to Data En-
cryption Standard (DES) and Adavanced Encryption Standard
algorithms. For instance, San Pedro et al. [93] propose the
FIRE attack that employs fault injection to reverse engineer
SBox specification of DES-like and AES-like block ciphers.
In the AES version of the FIRE, single-byte faults are injected
into the penultimate round of AES and faulty output data
are collected. Then, the faulty data are converted into a set
of linear Boolean equations. Finally, the equation system is
solved using the Gaussian elimination and the SBox is reverse-
engineered. Similarly, Jacob et al. [96] induce faults into the
execution of an obfuscated cipher and retrieve the secret key.
Courbon et al. [97] also demonstrated a method to reverse-
engineer gate-level structure of a hardware implementation
of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, in which
laser fault injection and image processing are combined.
VII. FAULT ATTACK EVALUATION AND CERTIFICATION
Given the abundance and diversity of attacks on hardware
products, the question arises for individual products: What
is the attack resistance, and how secure does the product
need to be? This question has been addressed by the global
security certification community, resulting in the Common
Criteria (CC) [98]. This standard defines levels of security
and a methodology for evaluation. A consortium of vendors,
certification bodies, and labs maintain a procedure for attack
rating.
Any product with secure hardware, for which a vendor seeks
certification, can be evaluated according to this methodology.
The aim is to provide sufficient assurance that the product
remains secure during several years of operation. In this
section, we first briefly explain the steps and actors involved
in the certification process. We then demonstrate how the fault
attack resistance of a product is evaluated.
A. The Common Criteria Certification Process
Three main roles exist in the certification process:
• Vendor is the manufacturer that develops the product to
be certified.
• Evaluator is the security evaluation lab that reviews and
tests the product design and implementation.
• Certification body is the authority that certifies the
product after successful completion of the evaluation.
Additional roles may be involved for separate software/hard-
ware vendors, for product issuers, and evaluation sponsors, but
these roles do not significantly change the basic model.
Figure 4 depicts a simplified view of how the three main
actors work together. The process takes the following steps:
Fig. 4. The Common Criteria (CC) Certification Process.
1) A vendor who wants to have a product CC certified
provides an evaluator with all relevant documents and
the product to be certified (i.e, Target of Evaluation–
TOE).Vendors need to create and maintain a signif-
icant set of documents describing the system design
and implementation in detail. These documents should
also include proof that the implementation meets its
specifications. The first task for the evaluator is to review
all documents and decide whether they conform to the
CC methodology and its requirements.
2) The certification body provides instructions to the eval-
uator as to how to evaluate the product. The evaluator
performs all relevant tests to prove resistance of the
product and informs the certification body. Strictly,
the evaluator verifies that the product conforms to its
security target, but the scope of that must be approved by
the certification body. If any blocking issues are found,
the product may need revision and re-evaluation.
3) The evaluator sends the Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) to the certification body (and to the vendor) who
then reviews the evidence reported by the evaluator.
Before issuing a certificate, the certification body may
mandate additional testing if new threats surfaced, or
when the test results gave reason to doubt.
4) If no objections remain, the certification body issues the
certificate.
A product typically consist of multiple layers (hardware,
operating system, applications) which can be independently
certified. This would start with the hardware certification, after
which composite evaluations can be done, where a new layer
is certified in conjunction with a certified platform.
The CC certification process is known to be cumbersome; it
is lengthy and costly [99]. Although completion of the process
may take a couple of months in an ideal situation, it often takes
much longer. Apart from cost and time-to-market, this also
carries a security penalty: Vendors may be hesitant to make
security improvements to a certified system since changes
break the certification. In this way, vulnerabilities may remain
longer in products than needed.
While Common Criteria certifications enjoy popularity for
high assurance products, it is not the only evaluation method-
ology. Other schemes exists such as EMVCo [100] and FIPS
140-2 [101], many of whom are lighter in execution. However,
the processes described here are similar across many schemes
and serve well to explain the ecosystem. Next, we will take a
closer look into the evaluation process.
B. Evaluation of Fault Attack Resistance
Products are always evaluated in white-box style. This
means an evaluation lab gets access to all product design and
implementation information. This will reduce evaluation cost
(no need for lengthy reverse engineering), and reduce the risk
of missing big security weaknesses. Typically an evaluation
consists of two phases:
1) Vulnerability Analysis (VA)
2) Penetration Testing (PT)
During the VA, the lab reviews the design and implementation
code of a product, and weighs this against applicable threats.
In the PT, a product is tested against a number of attacks
to measure its actual resistance. All successful attacks are
rated, and when their scores are sufficiently high, the product
qualifies for certification.
The evaluation methodology distinguishes between Iden-
tification and Exploitation. The former defines the cost of
demonstrating that the attack works on the product, while the
latter looks at the cost of repeating the attack. Both aspects are
important. For instance, an attack with very high initial cost
will scare away low-budget attackers, while a high repetitive
cost will prohibit attack scaling.
Parameters used in the attack rating are: 1) time, 2) exper-
tise, 3) product knowledge, 4) number of the target samples, 5)
equipment, 6) ability to configure target. The parameter time
is extremely important during an evaluation as this is most
often the limiting aspect during the penetration testing phase.
An evaluator cannot afford to lose time if several attacks are
to be executed within the typical time frame of a few months.
For efficiency, the PT starts with an investigation of sen-
sitivity to different fault injection methods. While Voltage
glitching is typically the simplest method, this is often pre-
vented by sensors. Alternative methods like EM and optical
glitching are more complex, but also harder to prevent. During
this sensitivity analysis the evaluator uses test software on
the target that runs loops and typical instructions that may
be affected. The test software accelerates the detection of
hardware weaknesses, and supports finding optimal attack
parameters, such as glitch intensity and duration. Figure 5
shows how the right combination of glitch voltage and glitch
length can be found. The green dots represent experiments that
did not affect the chip. Alternatively, the yellow dots represent
experiments where the glitch was too strong and resulted in
a reset of the chip. Finally, the red dots represent successful
glitch parameters that resulted in a an observable effect in the
test code. Figure 6 shows how effective temporal offsets are
found (represented as wait cycles on the x-axis).
Once a weakness is established, a setup is built to demon-
strate that the weakness can be exploited on the real prod-
Fig. 5. Relation between the glitch length, glitch voltage, and fault behavior.
Fig. 6. Relation between the glitch length, temporal offset (i.e, wait cycles),
and fault behavior.
uct software. This setup includes equipment for generating
glitches at the right time, and solutions to minimize the effect
of countermeasures. A highly automated setup runs for several
days and uses dedicated control procedures to manage smooth
repetition and fault logging. Ultimately, an evaluation results
in a report, where successful attacks are rated, and a discussion
is given on the attack risks and potential mitigation strategies.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a review on mechanisms, implementa-
tion, and evaluation of hardware-based fault attacks that aims
at breaking the security of embedded software. Our review
shows that multiple abstraction layers (software, instruction-
set, and hardware layers) take part in fault attacks and each
abstraction layer may be a target for an adversary. We also
observe that fault attacks breaks a fundamental assumption
made by secure embedded software: The hardware layer of
the embedded systems ensure the correct execution of the
embedded software. Therefore, fault attacks pose a serious se-
curity threat to any kind of security-critical software (firmware,
operating system, user applications, and cryptography) running
on embedded devices:
• In a fault attack on embedded software, the target of
fault injection is the hardware layer while the target of
exploitation is the software layer. Thus, it is not always
possible to mitigate the fault attack threat with software-
only countermeasures.
• Fault attacks do not require presence of a software
bug in the embedded software because the fault attacks
dynamically alter the behavior of the underlying hardware
through fault injection. As our review shows, this enables
fault attacks to dynamically induce software bugs, to
thwart countermeasures, and to enable other attacks.
• Although fault attacks traditionally require expertise and
expensive equipment, they tend to become more acces-
sible because of the advancement in the field. As we
demonstrate, today, it is possible to inject faults via
inexpensive hardware equipment (less than 500$) or via
only software programs.
Considering the increasing role of the embedded Internet of
Things (IoT) devices in our daily life and critical infras-
tructure, we believe that embedded hardware and software
developers need to put additional effort on mitigation and
evaluation of the fault attack risk on the embedded systems.
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